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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: The Impact of the ISM Code in Maritime field
Degree: MSc
The entry into force of the ISM Code will be one of the most important events in 
shipping. The implementation of the ISM Code will bring extensively impact in the 
shipping industry. This dissertation tried to analysis the impact of the ISM Code in 
the maritime field. It has focused on three main areas, namely the implementation of 
the ISM Code, the impact on limitation of liability and the impact on marine 
insurance.
The ISM Code only can make functions after it has been implemented properly and 
effectively. In order to achieve this objective. Flag States, Port States, Classification 
Society and Shipowners shall work together and carry out fully implementation of 
the ISM Code. It could not be function well enough if they worked isolation. Any 
shipping company who does not implemented the ISM Code sufficiently will face 
serious outcome. Ships which do not carry ISM certificates will face negative 
consequences, not only they will be detained by Port State Control, but also it is 
impossible to find a cargo because most ship-brokers will inevitably make ISM 
certification a conditon of charter.
The ISM Code will bring impacts on the shipowners limitation of liability. 
Obviously, due to the character of the ISM Code, it is convenient for the claimant to 
find some evidences to proof whether the shipowner has actual fault or with the 
intent to cause such a loss or with the knowledge that such a loss would probably 
result. With the success of such proof, the shipowner will be deprived of the 
limitation of liability. With the establishment of the Designated Person(s) with the 
ISM system, it is difficult for the shipowner to take a black eye for the deficiency 
found on board its ships, if he continue doing so, his limitation of liability will 
possibly be challenged.
The ISM Code brings some changes in marine insurance. P&I Clubs changed the 
rule of its insurance in the light of the coming into force of the ISM Code. The 
insured probably is not entitled to get his cover as a result of the breach of the ISM 
Code.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
When reading reports on investigations into maritime casualties over the decades it 
becomes clear that most casualties have come about as a result of human failures. 
The statistical analyses suggest that around 80 per sent of all shipping accidents are 
caused by human error. The underlying truth is that the act or omission of a human 
being plays some part in virtually every accident, including those where structural or 
equipment failure may be the immediate cause.
For a long time, special emphasis has been laid on utilising high technology in 
ship’s construction and equipment. A great deal of regulations on technical aspects 
of shipping have been developed by IMO and national authorities, nevertheless, 
such regulations can only achieve part of the objective of safe and pollution-free 
ship operations. The task facing us now is to prevent and minimise the scope for 
human error which contributes, directly or indirectly to a casualty, as well as we 
insist on high standards in ship’s construction and equipment.
In the last few years there have been a significant decline in the number of casualties 
due to structure failures. In comparison the human error related casualty ratio has 
increased. The often quoted figure of 80 per cent of accidents and casualties being 
caused by human error may be on an upward trend. Fragmentation of the industry 
and commercial pressures have led to a reduction in operational expertise afloat and 
ashore and there is a need to compensate this with a more structured system.
Losses, both of ships and seafarers, on the level of previous years are no longer 
acceptable. Nor is damage to the environment through accidental, or indeed 
deliberate, pollution. And the ship and the shore must take responsibility. The master 
can no longer be left to bear sole responsibility for the operation and safety of his 
ship without someone being actively and visibly responsible ashore.
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During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there are several serious maritime disasters 
that occurred, which resulted in loss of life of large number of people and as well as 
damaged to the environment especially to the marine environment. In March 1989 
the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound near Valdez in 
Alaska. The probable cause* of this was, in the words of the US National 
Transportation Safety Board(NTSB), "... the failure of the third mate to properly
manoeuvre the vessel because of fatigue and excessive workload;.....the failure of
Exxon Shipping Company to provide a fit master and a rested and sufficient crew for 
the Exxon Valdez...” (Jorgen Rasmussen, 1999). Another example is the Ro/Ro 
ferry Herald of Free Enterprise, which capsized off Zeebrugge and caused 188 
passengers loss of their life. According to the Sheen-Commission report, the main 
reasons are as follows:
• Board of Directors did not appreciate their responsibility;
• Management, from top down to the junior superintendent shared the 
responsibility of the accident.
• Top to bottom infected with the disease of sloppiness;
• Failure to give clear orders contributed greatly.
Considering the above facts and the political pressure coming from the international 
community, the Assembly of the International Maritime Organisation adopted the 
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution 
Prevention, namely the international Safety Management Code(ISM Code) as a 
recommendation in 1993 and made it mandatory by means of the 1994 SOLAS 
amendments. The Code is unique among IMO Conventions in that it addresses the 
management of ships. It is not prescriptive, but defines its objectives and provides a 
framework within which shipowners are required to develop a safety management 
system appropriate to their operation, thereby imposing a degree of self-regulation. 
The entry into force of the ISM Code is the one of the most important events in
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shipping industry this decade. Just as Mr. O’Neil, Secretary-General of IMO, stated 
in the foreword to a book on the ISM Code on December 1998:
“ The adoption of the ISM Code is one of the most important development in 
maritime safety of the last decade. Previously, IMO’s attempts to improve shipping 
safety and to prevent pollution from ships had been largely directed at improving the 
hardware of shipping-for example, the construction of ships and their equipment. 
The ISM Code, by comparison, concentrates on the way shipping companies are run. 
This is important, because we know that human factors accovmt for most accidents at 
sea and that many of them can ultimately be traced to management. The Code will 
undoubtedly help to raise management standards and practices and thereby reduce 
accidents and save lives.”
The ISM Code is the international standard for the safe management and operation of 
ships and for pollution prevention. It is obvious that the ISM Code in its entirety 
\deals with the human element, after all it is a code on management. In the preamble 
it is stated that” The cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from 
the top. In matters of safety and pollution prevention it is the commitment, 
competence, attitudes and motivation of individuals at all levels that determine the 
end result.”
In order to create a safety culture it is necessary to be aware of safety implications. 
Then there must be the commitment to do what awareness shows to be necessary. 
The next requirement is for people to have competence to do what is necessary in the 
right way. It must be realised that competence does not depend only on the 
capability of an individual, but also on the appropriateness of that capability to the 
particular task at hand. People are not bom with an attitude. Attitudes are shaped 
and developed by both the individuals and the circumstances surrovmding them. If 
changes are made to the behaviour or the circumstances which shaped the original 
attitudes, then the new circumstances will shape new attitudes. As for the
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motivation, it is a quite important element to encourage people to fulfil their task as 
well as possible. It is linked from the top management to the bottom.
The ISM code will be implemented in two stages depending on the types of ships.
/ t*
The first stage applied for all passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft; 
oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high speed craft of 
I 500 grt and above not later than 1®* July, 1998, which counts for a total of around 
\ 12,000 ships. The second stage will apply for all other cargo ships and mobile 
offshore drilling units of 500 grt and above.
Shipping companies have the obligation to establish a safety management 
system(SMS) to meet the requirements of the ISM Code. There is no excuse for not 
complying. Owners have been given ample warning and those who think the Code 
will not happen are deluding themselves. These shipping companies that do not 
carry ISM certification could face the following consequences:
• They will be banned from ports in Europe, North American, the Far East and 
many others parts of the biggest trading nations.
• They could find their insurance cover has been withdraw; many insurance 
companies and P&I Clubs have announced that compliance with the ISM Code will 
be regarded as an essential condition of insurance.
• They could find it impossible to find a cargo. Most ship- brokers will inevitably 
make ISM certification a condition of charter.
• They will be forced to try and make a living in the handful of countries where the 
Code is not strictly enforced. Even if they are able to find some cargoes to carry, they 
will be forced to accept very low rates because the vast majority of shippers will opt 
for shipping companies that have ISM accreditation. (Fairplay, 1998)
The entry into force ISM Code has widely potential impacts in the maritime field. 
The impacts are not only related to the safety aspects of the ships but also related to
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the commercial and legal aspects of shipowners, insurers and charters. In this 
dissertation, the author will discuss the following issues:
^ In chapter 2, the author will analyse the relationship between maritime casualty and 
I the human error as well as the objectives of the ISM Code. With the development of 
I the high technology in ship building and equipment, the maritime casualties due to
I structure failures have declined and the human error related casualties ratio has
I
! increased. One solution to the problem is to emphasis the human element through the 
' ISM Code and try to reduce maritime casualties due to the hurhan error. Moreover,
' the objectives of the ISM Code will be examined and discuss the way to achieve the
In Chapter 3, the author will describe the responsibilities of Flag States, Port State 
Control, Classification Society and Shipowners in the implementation of the ISM 
Code. These parties should work together efficiently for the purpose of the ISM 
Code implementation to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of 
life, and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to the marine 
environment and to property.
In Chapter 4, the most important Chapter in the dissertation, the author will focus on 
the impact of the ISM Code on the shipowner’s limitation of liability. The related 
international conventions with the limitation of liability will be examined. The 
potential impact of the ISM Code on the limitation of shipowner’s liability will be 
deeply analysed. The shipowner-ship link, made visible by the ISM requirements for 
reporting structures and documentary evidence, will make it very hard for an owner 
to limit liability. “ Actual fault or privity” have been in the past the only way in 
which liability limitation could be lost. These have been defences in the past but 
under the ISM Code it will be too easy for it to be shown that the highest levels of 
management in a shipping company were aware of a situation(deferred repairs, for 
example) which could lead to an accident. Faced with this prospect, the options are 
to do nothing since you are confident in your safety system, do everything possible to
conform with ISM and then more. Cargo owners under the Hague and Hague-Visby 
rules may also be able to sue shipowners more easily under ISM, since the same 
requirements for reporting and records will strip away the defence of demonstrating 
the exercise of due diligence in making the ship seaworthy. Cargo owners will 
simply have to show the actual negligence was that of the “directing mind and will” 
of the company.
In Chapter 5, the author will discuss the impact of the ISM Code on insurers . P&I 
Club had advised it members that compliance with the Code will be made a 
condition of cover under the Club’s rules. Members who fail to comply with 
statutory requirements related to the safe management and operation of ships will be 
unable to recover claims, whether or not they result from non-compliance. The Club 
will also decline to accept as new members any shipowner who do not have valid 
ISM certificates.(AR Hill, 1998.).
Conclusion will be addressed in the last Chapter. With the implementation of the 
ISM Code around the maritime industry, the potential impacts of the ISM Code will 
emerge more and more. We must face the golden opportunity as well as the 
challenge resulting from the ISM Code and reduce the cost to the minimum and 
achieve the maximum profits during the safe operation of ships and the safe 
management of companies.
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Chapter 2 The role of the ISM Code
2.1 Human element and marine casualty
2.1.1 General
The human element in shipping is something that has been talked about for many 
years but somehow things have always carried on much as before. Crews continued 
to be cut, mainly for economic and competitive reasons. Investment in maritime 
education and training was also scaled down, in many cases to levels where the 
numbers being trained became insufficient to maintain the required numbers of 
qualified seafarers. Warnings of skills shortages and concerns over safety and social 
impact largely went unheeded.
For many years solutions to identified safety concerns and the response to incidents 
have concentrated on engineering and design aspects. Add a double hull here, install 
a watertight bulkhead there, put in an alarm system, improve firefighting and 
evacuation systems and so on. All these measures are fine and necessary. But 
despite a growing realisation that in themselves these measures are necessary but not 
sufficient to improve safety and that the human element in various forms plays a 
major role, the industry had not acted on this fact.
So what has changed ? there seems to have been a marked change in attitude in the 
industry generally. A recognition has emerged that purely technical and design 
solutions to problems have virtually reached saturation point. Harmut Hormaim, 
director of ship safety at Germanischer Lloyd, recently commented to ISM: “ in ship 
safety we are at a turning point in regulatory matters, moving away form hardware 
towards a focus on the human element. Regulation of hardware aspects is now
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comprehensive. It is difficult to see further major advance in hardware safety. Now 
the marine community is starting to address the vast void space called the human 
element.”
2.1.2 Results of investigation
UK P&I Club seeks real reasons behind costly mistakes
A major investigation into the underlying reasons for shipping insurance claims that 
are blamed on human error carried out by the UK P&I Club.
“three of five claims are effectively still caused by human error ” according to Mr 
Kerry Lawford, director of loss prevention services. “ why do otherwise well-trained 
people make mistakes? What goes wrong?” he asked. It was time to get behind the 
label of human error, he said, and discover the real reasons. He was speaking at the 
public presentation of the club’s 10-year survey of major claims-that is above 
$100000-between 1987 and 1997. Such claims account for a tiny percentage of the 
total, only 2 per cent by value. Over the period of the survey, human error accounted 
for 58 per cent of them.
In certain circumstances, the survey points out properly trained personnel can 
become careless and even reckless.
Specific risk areas it identified are:
• Language problems in the mixed nationality ships, and between ship and shore- 
side personnel, particularly when engaged in critical activities such as berthing and 
bunkering.
• Confusion due to poor communication between master and pilot.
• Fatigue resulting from smaller crews and shorter turnaround times in port.
• Minor miscalculations leading to ship instability and as a consequence cargo 
loss.
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Pride including crew to carry out tasks single-handedly which should be excluded 
with assistance.
Calculated risks by masters and officers responding to commercial 
pressures.(The Sea, 2000)
2.1.3 Categories of human error
There are a number of reasons why human error contributed so high percentage 
regarding the causes of marine casualties. The major reasons are as follows:
2.1.3.1 Lack of knowledge and/or experience
Some older seafarers do not have sufficient knowledge regarding operating the ship 
safely and effectively. There are number of reasons. Some of them had no chance to 
attend the maritime academy and accordingly failed to be well-trained, who came to 
the ship for service relying on their experience of serving on navy. They feel certain 
difficulties to keep abreast of the technological developments not only due to their 
poor educational background but also lack of chance to leave the ship to be trained 
with the fear of unemployment pressure.
2.1.3.2 Lack of communication
The lack of a common language, mainly during an emergency situation, has proved 
to be a contributing factor to the human element affecting maritime safety. Today 
multi-national crews are very commonly employed for the purpose of cheaper labour 
costs. Clear and understandable communications among multi-national crews is 
necessary to ensure the operation of the ship safely. Communication is a key element 
in the control of ship operations, and its absence makes marine casualties inevitable.
The lack of communication among multi-national crew members does not only invite 
an adverse social environment, but more seriously has negative influences on the 
safety, harmony and smoothness of the ship’s routine operations. It is obviously
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important that in a crisis situation they must be able to communicate with each other 
more accurately and rapidly rather than just try to utilise a language one is not 
familiar with.
2.1.3.3 Fatigue
There are a number of factors which contribute to fatigue on board ships. A number 
of accidents or casualties on ships have occurred where the cause of such accidents 
could be the fatigue on the ship’s crew members.
Fatigue is defined as a state or condition of exhaustion, weariness or extreme 
depletion of physical or mental reserves or capabilities. Fatigue results in the 
degradation of human performance, the slowing down of physical and mental 
reflexes and/or the impairment of the ability to make rational judgements. Fatigue 
may be induced by factors such as prolonged periods of mental or physical activity, 
inadequate rest, adverse environment factors, physiological factors and /or stress or 
other psychological factors. (Annex of Resolution A.772-18).
Fatigue is always accompanied by the result of reduced crews, less experienced or 
well-trained seafarers. The most common factor of fatigue are due to:
• unplanned maintenance programme which put pressure on crew members.
• The quick loading and unloading of cargoes
• Not properly laid down routine on board
• Lack of rest on the job
• Excessive workloads
• Interpersonal relations
• Cultural changes
Some of the environment conditions that create fatigue situation on board are:
• vibration
• noise
• ship’s motion
• bad weather condition
• unsafe or hazardous vessel conditions
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• type of trading
the group on the ship which is mostly exposed to fatigue is the masters and senior 
deck officers, chief engineer and senior engineer officers as they are all loaded with 
responsibilities of safe running of the vessel.
Some of the contributing factors could be:
• longer pilotage distance in heavy traffic areas
• longer stand-by period
• short sea passages on some trades
• fast tank cleaning due to loading and unloading
• constant engine breakdown
• blackout situation on board.
2.1.3.4 Stress
Stress on crew members is a very important issue that shipping companies or shore- 
based organisation should take into consideration. The trends within the shipping 
industry may lead to serious stress and lower morales which in turn are affecting the 
ships safety.
The nature of seafaring which involves long periods of isolation from home, families 
and the shore community at large, is creating great stressful atmosphere. Some of the 
causes which contribute to the problem, a combination of factors such as less time in 
port, smaller crew member(reduced manning), workload and condition of the ship 
can be much to bear.
The behaviour of some shipping companies adds to low morale and serious stress 
conditions onboard. It could be the non-payment of wages or very low paid wages 
and poor communication problems on mixed-nationality crew ships. Inadequate food 
and the slow delivery of mail to seafarers increase the stressful conditions onboard.
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Religious background and differences in culture contribute to an increase in stress on 
the crew. Also there are perceived fears which prevent many seafarers from 
reporting many of the deficiencies or safety infringement on board ship. They close 
their eyes and mouths when it comes to matters of safety and they endanger their 
lives. The fear because of which they refrain from complaining could be for many 
reasons such as being replaced by another seafarer who can be paid less. They may 
also be the breadwinners of their entire families or relatives and can not afford to lose 
their work even though conditions on the ship are unbearable.
If the crew are given more responsibility in doing or running things themselves with 
the support from the shore-based organisations, then they would feel that they are 
being valued and would be far less stressed which will increase their ability in 
performing their duties. It would definitely increase the level of safety onboard ship 
and all the crew members would live onboard in peace and harmony.
2.1.4 Suggestions for reducing human errors
In order to prevent or eliminate the human error in the safe operation of ships, the 
following aspects must be taken into consideration and highlighted.
2.1.4.1 Emphasise training of seafarers in accordance with STCW78/95
Attempting to improve the human element, the STCW78 Convention was principally 
revised so as to produce new STCW95 Convention which entered into force in 
February 1997. An important feature of the STCW95 is the mandatory Part A of the 
STCW Code which outlines in detail not only the compliance on which syllbus of 
courses should be based but also assessment methods and even requiring assessment 
by demonstrated skill where applicable.
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Continuous training is necessary to keep abreast of the rapid technological 
developments in the shipping industry. Most of the accidents on board ships are 
caused by operational errors despite the fact that the international community is 
trying hard in the training of seafarers.
It is always possible to produce better trained crews to do their job, the training effort 
should concentrate not only on producing better, well-trained and motivated 
management and crew for the future, but also on upgrading and better motivating 
existing personnel.
There should be review training for older seafarers who left maritime academies 
many years ago for upgrading due to the technological developments in the maritime 
sector. Most accidents or incidents on ships are also caused due to lack of knowledge 
of sophistication of the systems and the equipment on the ship. Therefore, complete 
understanding of the system is required by the operators to achieve correct running of 
the ships.
It is important that these older seafarers keep abreast with the present day 
developments in shipping industry. Older seafarers who are used to the old fashion 
ways of navigation or engine room complexities would be able to cope with the 
present day ship operations as the result of the training.
In China, at the current stage, the Chinese seafarers usually are convened on the 
maritime universities for training for the purpose of the eligibility and passing the 
certificate examination. If a seafarer can pass the written examinations carried out 
by China Maritime Safety Administration, obviously he can obtain the related 
qualification certificate regardless whether he is competent for his specific post on 
board the ship. It is hardly to assess the real ability of the seafarer regarding his 
service on board the ship. Particularly, it is very difficult to assess the English skills
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of the seafarer such as speaking ability and listening ability on the basis of the fact of 
passing the written English test.
With the complete implementation of the STCW78/95, the seafarers have to be 
trained not only for the eligibility certificates but also for the assessment of the 
practical skills. In other words, a seafarer can not obtain his certificates until both his 
written examinations and assessment meet the minimum requirements of the 
Convention. Moreover, the senior officers are required to be trained on related 
simulators for the improvement of the safety at sea and prevention of pollution as 
well.
2.1.4.2 Stringent implementation of the ISM Code
As mentioned in the Chapter I, one of the objectives of the ISM Code is to minimise 
the scope of poor human decisions which contribute directly or indirectly to a 
casualty or pollution accident. It is important that shipping companies adopt a human 
element perspective or attitude so as to make positive and effective changes to 
maritime safety and protection of the marine environment. In identified risks, as 
required by the ISM Code, the company should consider “fatigue” as a primary 
contributing factor for many foreseeable risks. Companies are encouraged to review 
their laid down policies and operational procedures and give due consideration for 
aspects such as on board work schedules regarding fatigue. Each company should 
develop individual strategies to manage the fatigue issue to arrive at an optimum 
operating safety standard.
2.1.4.3 Motivation
People are not motivated when they do not know how well they are doing in their 
working places. They need to know what is expected of them and they need to know 
how well or poorly they have performed. People do not want to have their
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personalities treated as company property, but they are eager to learn how well they 
have done in accomplishing the objectives of their job.
When morale and motivation are low due to any cause such as severe boredom, 
fatigue, depression, lack of job satisfaction, anxiety etc, then functional performance 
is diminished accordingly. It is said that “any circumstance significantly diminishing 
or degrading human performance or functional potentials could be due to low morale 
or motivation.”
The most vital item in safe manning of a vessel is motivated crew members . If a 
seafarer only works for his daily bread or wages, he will never do a good job. But by 
getting a sense of great importance with his employer, partners and teamwork within 
the ship’s staff would give great access to job satisfaction which is essential in our 
day-to-day activities.
With regard to motivation, it will be even more important when one is talking about 
reduced crews since the workload increases. Seafarers can be motivated to practice 
safe behaviour if incentives are given which correspond to their social and physical 
needs. If the safety aspects are a high priority goals for a shipping company, then 
the seafarers will be motivated to pay attention to safety.
2.2 Objectives of the ISM Code
A key feature of the ISM Code is that it does not introduce any new technical 
standards, but that its operation should ensure that all relevant existing rules and 
regulations are complied with. As defined in the ISM Code, the objectives of the 
ISM Code covers the following aspects:
• Ensuring safety at sea
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• Prevention of human injury or loss of life
• Avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to the marine 
environment and to property.
During the past years the international maritime coimnunity has concentrated more 
attention on ships and their equipment and also adapted adequate relevant 
conventions and codes in respect of the safety at sea and pollution prevention. The 
Code together with existing conventions and codes represents an adequate set of 
requirements to guarantee a good safety level. However, the rules on their own are of 
little value unless they are effectively implemented. The problem is not lack of 
standards or regulations but rather their inadequate implementation and 
enforcement. So the ISM Code moved towards human issues both of training of 
seafarers and the exercise of responsibility by those operating shipping companies.
The safe and efficient operation of ships depends on the Holy Trinity of 
management:
• Well designed, constructed and maintained ships
• Capable, committed management personnel
• Competent, qualified and experienced seafarers.
If either of the foregoing is deficient, the whole operation will be jeopardised and 
problems and accidents will occur. This is why the ISM Code has come into being to 
ensure that all three of these requirements are equally addressed by an Owner or 
Manager. (Jhc, 1996)
The Code sets down certain requirements and guidelines. How the company achieve 
compliance with these requirements is the company’s responsibility. Actually, a 
company does not need to replace its existing systems and procedures, what a 
company need to do is to modify if required and to re-organise the dociunentation 
and ensure it fully meet the requirements of the ISM Code. It is necessary for a 
company to document its policies, procedures and operating instructions to ensure
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that every one in the company, both ashore and afloat, understands how the company 
wishes to operate. Also without procedures being documented, it would not be 
possible to show objective evidence to a third party(the Flag State Administration) 
that the company conduct its affairs in a planned and effective manner.
Each company should establish a Safety Management System(SMS) to ensure 
compliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and applicable codes, guidelines 
and standards recommended by the IMO, Administrations, classification societies 
and maritime industry organisations are taken into accoimt. The objectives of the 
SMS should:
• Provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment
• Establish safeguards against all identified risks and
• Continuously improve safe management skills for personnel ashore and aboard 
ships, including preparing for emergencies related both to safety and environment 
protection.(Section 1.2.2, ISM Code)
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Chapter 3 Implementation of the ISM Code
3.1 Flag States responsibility
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) establishes the fundamental 
principles and thereby makes it clear that having a shipping register is not an 
unfettered right of a sovereign state but one which is qualified as a result of the 
obligations imposed on the state, especially with regard to ensuring compliance with 
international minimum safety, pollution prevention and social standards.
The duties and responsibilities of flag states are firmly established in international 
law and provisions are binding all states. All flag states should abide by their 
international obligations and take the necessary enforcement measures so as to secure 
the implementation of the ISM Code by vessels flying their flag.
The efforts of Flag States are of primary importance in ensuring that ships conform 
to international safety standards such as the ISM Code. That is why the Maritime 
Safety Committee of IMO is currently looking into improving Flag State 
implementation of the main IMO safety conventions through its FSI Sub-Committee, 
as well as focusing on streaming the rights and obligations of port States.
The Flag State must be responsible for the following aspects in respect of the 
implementation of the ISM Code efficiently and sufficiently.
3.1.1 Establishing the necessary national legislation to guide proper 
implementation of the ISM Code
Every administration must have in place the necessary national legislation covering:
• Scope of application
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1• Verification and certification
• Entry into force and
• The code itself.
With regard to verification and certification the legislation must cover audits(initial, 
periodical and renewal) and the certificates(DOC and SMC), including conditions for 
their validity.
Moreover, it is necessary to develop the national guidelines to companies on the 
following;
• How to apply for certification?
• The documentation need when applying
• How audits will be organised and carried out
• The structure of the cooperation between the company and the Adnminstration.
• Such guidelines should be developed in close cooperation with the maritime 
industry in the country, i.e. shipowners and trade unions.
3.1.2 Establishing control mechanism to ensure the ISM Code being properly 
implemented
A large number of Administrations have delegated fully or in part their statutory 
work to Classification Societies. It is also the case with regard to the implementation, 
verification and certification of the ISM Code.
Even if an Administration decided to delegate in full all work concerning the ISM 
Code, the necessary national legislation must be developed and adopted and some 
guidance must be given by the Administration to the Societies and to the companies. 
The Administration which delegates its audits and certification work to the 
Classification Society must establish some control mechanism to be able to monitor 
the work being carried out on their behalf and ensure the related certificates have 
been issued in accordance with the requirements of the ISM Code. Each 
Administration must be aware that the responsibility can never be delegated to other
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parties such as the Classification Societies. It is always the first responsibility of the 
Flag State to ensure ships flying its flag to implement the ISM Code properly.
3.1.3 Providing qualified personnel involving the ISM Code.
All Administrations should also have properly qualified persoimel to be used for 
verification and certification purposes. This applies in both cases, when 
Administration carries out the actual work itself or if it decides to delegate the work. 
The auditor must possess adequate experience of the operation of ships and 
knowledge of a company’s shore-based operations, he or she must also have solid 
knowledge of relevant rules and regulations. Even if the audits and certification 
work have been delegated to other parties, an Administration still must monitor the 
work done on its behalf, and in order to be able to do that the qualified personnel is 
needed. In addition, these Administrations who decide to carry out auditing and 
certification themselves must also consider the need for internal procedures and 
instructions for their auditors.
3.1.4 Taking measures for enforcement of the implementation of the ISM Code
Flag states should also consider taking additional measures such as bringing 
proceedings against vessels flying their flag which are operating without the required 
ISM certification, and imposing penalties of adequate severity to discourage such 
violations of international minimum rules and standards. The Flag State must be 
aware that Port State Control can never substitute the Flag State though sometimes 
the Port State can find the sub-standard vessel and force it to take appropriate 
corrective measures to meet the requirements of the relevant conventions.
3.2 Port State Responsibility
3.2.1 General
Port State Control(PSC) which means the inspection of foreign flag vessels visiting 
national ports has been defined as the last safety net in maritime safety. PSC is 
recognised as being a step in the right direction towards the eradication of 
substandard ships, when it is carried out in accordance with IMO Assembly 
resolutions and recommendations.
Port State Control is described as a secondary tier of enforcement, the first 
responsibility for compliance with international convention standards remains with 
the Flag State. Port states are not obligated to inspect foreign ships, but do so in the 
interests of safety and pollution prevention. While Flag States are responsible for the 
eiiforcement of IMO Conventions, PSC is seen as fulfilling a caretaker role in terms 
of supervising the application of Conventions. Port State Control aims at eliminating ' 
the operation of substandard ships but it is not a substitute for the Flag State’s 
responsibilities. The increasing failure on the part of some Flag States to effectively 
implement and enforce international standards for safety and pollution prevention 
has led to the increased strengthening of the role of the Port State as a policing 
mechanism for the shipping industry and a “safety net” for the Flag State.
In recent years. Port State Control has become a key element in singling out 
unscrupulous operators and eventually eliminating substandard vessels. It is now 
commonly acknowledged that Port State Control will play an important role in 
determining whether the implementation of the ISM Code on board ship is as
effective as desired. The role of the Port State comes into view in Regulation 6 of
---------------------------------- ---------------—~ —------------- -------------------—
Chapter IX^hich stipulates that a ship shall be subject to control in accordance with 
Regulation XI/4. Certificates shall be treated as those issued under Regulation 1/12 or 
1/13 and therefore the control provisions of Regulation 1/19 should also be 
considered relevant in this context. In practical terms this means that ^rt S_tate 
Control Officers(PSCO) will also verify the Document of Compliar]|l(DOC)jndjhe 
Safety Management Certificate(SMC) on board the ships which have to comply.
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3.2.2 Control Procedures on ISM Code by Port States
The Port State Control Committee of the Paris MOU, recognising the importance of 
the control procedures contained in the ISM Code, has adopted Provisional 
Guidelines for the Control on the ISM Code, and decided that the implementation 
dates regarding certification will be strictly enforced.
t
The provisional guidelines include the following procedures.
• during the initial inspection, the DOC and the SMC will be verified. An SMC is 
not valid unless the operating company holds a valid DOC for that ship type.
• When ISM certification is absent or inaccurate or detainable deficiencies in other 
areas are foimd, the ship shall be subject to a more detailed inspection.
• If no SMC can be produced on board, the ship shall be detained until such 
certificates have been provided.
When the flag state or the company do not or can not provide valid ISM certification, 
the detention may be raised, the ship shall be refused access to all Paris MOU ports 
until valid ISM certificates can be provided.
The Safety Management Certificate represents the flag state’s verification that the 
vessel has an adequate safety management system in place that complies with the 
ISM Code. Under the Port State Control program, this certificate, required by 
chapter IX of SOLAS, will be examined along with the vessel’s other required 
international certificates. In addition, a copy of the company’s Document of 
Compliance, issued to the owner, manager or bareboat charterer, will be examined 
during the boarding. Of course, a company must hold a valid Document of 
Compliance endorsed for specific vessel types before a Safety Management 
Certificate can be issued to its vessels.
Upon completion of the document check, the boarding officers will conduct a general 
walk-through of the vessel as part of the port state control examination. If, during the 
general examination, the boarding team establishes” clear grounds” to believe that 
the condition of the vessel, its equipment or crew does not correspond substantially
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with the particulars of the vessel’s certificates, the validity of the safety management 
system will be questioned and the examination will be expanded into the area of the 
ISM Code compliance.
The expanded examination will generally be limited to the area of concern. Serious 
structural deficiencies or significant problems in life-saving, fire-fighting, machinery 
or pollution prevention, along with poorly maintained equipment and structures as 
well as inadequate training, will give the boarding team cause to question the 
validity of the ship’s safety management system. The first part of the expanded ISM 
Code’s examination will involve a review of the vessel’s safety management manual. 
The following items will be checked for inclusion in the manual:
• the company’s safety and environment protection policy;
• procedures for preparation and response to emergency situations, including 
steering failures, loss of bridge control, fire, abandoning ship, groimding, flooding, 
collision, medical emergencies, oil spills and emergency drills;
• the company’s designated person for the safety management system;
• procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions of 
the code to the designated person and finally
• written operational procedures and maintenance manuals required by the safety 
management manual to be on board and understood by the responsible crew 
members.
3.2.3 Operational requirements
During an expanded examination, the following operational requirements of the ISM 
Code will also be verified:
• the officers and crew are familiar with the safety management system and 
procedures related to their duties;
• The company training programme is in place for all personnel, including new and 
transferred persons, and all personnel to be familiar with their duties.
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• The ship’s officers are familiar with the schedule of internal audits specified in 
the safety manual and able to verify that internal audits have taken place. The port 
state control officer(PSCO) will not examine the results of internal audits, he/she will 
only verify that they are being conducted.
• The PSCO will, however, examine the results of the last external audit performed 
by the organisation issuing the ISM certificates, including the status of any open non­
conformities.
• The PSCO will verify that the procedures relating to the deficient system are 
documented as required by the safety manual and that the appropriate individuals are 
familiar with the procedures.
• If routine maintenance is required, the PSCO will verify that maintenance was 
performed and recorded as required.
• The expanded examination will then be conducted by verifying that the 
appropriate non-conformities are documented and the safety management system is 
in fact put to use for the continuous improvement of vessel operations.
Regulation 6 of Chapter IX of SOLAS authorises control of a vessel for non- 
compliance with the vessel’s Safety Management Certificate in accordance with 
Chapters I and XL
Vessels will be detained under this authority only if the required certificates are not 
on board or an expanded ISM Code examination reveals serious non-conformities 
with the ISM Code include:
• a lack of the required certificates attesting to the validity of the safety 
management system.
• Lack of a safety management manual or
• Major safety system deficiencies where, for instance, critical systems procedures 
required by the safety manual are not on board and the systems in question are so 
severely deteriorated as to make the vessel unseaworthy or constitute a threat to the 
crew or the marine environment.
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In 1998 the Paris MOU Port State Control Committee agreed to mount a 
Concentrated Inspection Campaign aimed at ships entering its region to which the 
International Safety Management Code applied. The campaign, which was held in 
conjunction with Tokyo MOU, ran from 1 July to 30 September 1998. First results 
showed that a total of 1575 eligible ships were inspected during the campaign. A 
uniform questionnaire was used* by Port State Control Officers to test key elements of 
the ship’s safety management system. A total of 81 ships were detained in port for 
major non-conformities in their systems, resulting in an average detention percentage 
of 5.1%. Three ships have been banned from the Paris MOU region for not having 
ISM certificates on board and a safety management system in place. These ships will 
not be allowed to enter any of the Paris MOU ports until evidence has been provided 
that a certified management system is in place. (BIMCO, 1999)
Taking the implementation dates into account, ships shall be subject to control in 
accordance with regulation XI/4. This implies that when the PSCO has clear grounds 
for believing that the master and crew are not familiar with essential shipboard safety 
procedures, operational drills and demonstrations may be required.
If the operational proficiency of the crew is not of an acceptable level, the ship may 
be detained. This decision will be based on the opinion of the PSCO.
Although the ISM Code is related to a documented and approved safety management 
system, it is obvious that there has to be a clear link with the officers and crew on 
board. If the crew only considers the management system as a piece of paper without 
following the principles in their day to day practice on board, deficiencies and non­
conformities are to be expected on board.
The ISM Code represents part of the culmination of an evolving recognition within 
the maritime shipping community that the human element is a critical factor in 
preventing casualties or pollution incidents. The scope of the relevant IMO and ILO 
conventions has now effectively been expanded to address the human element, as
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well as engineering, design and operational concerns. However, as with any 
convention, unless implemented they can not serve the purpose for which they were 
created. It is the obligation of all responsible parties(ie owners, flag states and 
classification societies) to properly implement the conventions in order to eliminate 
substandard shipping effectively.
3.3 Classification Society’s Responsibility
The greatest contribution to improve maritime safety can only come from higher 
conformance by the world fleet to recognised IMO Convention and international 
safety standards. The ISM Code is therefore a vital instrument to bring the 
improvements expected by the international community. Improved and consistent 
compliance through stronger enforcement of international rules and regulations are 
central objectives of the ISM Code.
To comply with the ISM Code, shipowners are required to develop, implement and 
maintain a Safety Management System(SMS), with conformance of shore-based 
management operations to standards validated by a Document of Compliance(DOC). 
The SMS also requires audited compliance of vessels to retain mandatory Safety 
Management Certificates(SMCs). What is the International Association of 
Classification Society(IACS) role in terms of the implementation of the ISM Code? 
According to the author’s generalizations Classification Society must be responsible 
for the following aspects:
3.3.1 Issuing the related certificates on behalf of Flag Administrations
Through delegation by Flag Administrations, much of the audit workload for Code 
compliance will be undertaken by the lACS societies, which have a unique technical 
understanding of the world merchant fleet and the Conventions on which the Code is 
based. Many Flag Administrations have delegated the LACS societies to issue the 
Safety Management Certificates(SMC) for ships due to lack of resources, and some 
Flag Administrations also delegated the LACS societies to issue the Document of
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Compliance(DOC) for a shipping company. Therefore, the lACS must control the 
ISM Code certification delivery and ensure that the ISM Code certification services 
are under the responsibility and authority of the lACS Member Society and not of 
any of its subsidiary bodies or sub-contractors.
China Classification Society(CCS), one of the lACS members, has been contributing 
many tasks regarding the implementation of the ISM Code. China Maritime Safety 
Administration has delegated the CCS to audit and issue a Safety Management 
Certificate(SMC) for each of Chinese ships. However, issuing a Document of 
Compliance(DOC) for a shipping company still has been carried out by the 
Administration themselves. A total number of 756 ships already carry the SMCs 
issued by the CCS. Below is the list giving details regarding the SMCs of Chinese 
ships.
Flag
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
Hong Kong, China
Hong Kong, China
Liberia
Liberia
Liberia
Malta
Marshall
Panama
ship type number
Bulk carrier 134
Chemical tanker 13
Gas carrier 23
Oil tanker 91
Other cargo ship 129
passenger high speed craft 54
Passenger ship 9
Bulk carrier 23
Other cargo ship 1
Bulk carrier 29
Oil tanker 4
Other cargo ship 7
Bulk carrier 6
Bulk carrier 1
Bulk carrier 98
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Panama Gas carrier 5
Panama Oil tanker 28
Panama other cargo ship 41
Panama Passenger ship 2
Singapore Bulk carrier 6
Singapore Oil tanker 5
Singapore Oil tanker/Chemical tanker 1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Bulk carrier 20
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Oil tanker 1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Oil tanker/Chemical tanker 2
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Other cargo ship 22
Vanuatu Oil tanker 1
3.3.2 Establishing the procedures to train the certification auditors
ISM Code certification requires profound maritime experience. The certifying 
organisation must possess sufficient knowledge and expertise in mandatory 
classification and statutory requirements as well as in* the process and procedures to 
ensure complete and accurate application of mandatory rules and regulations. 
Qualification for auditors therefore include the need for thorough knowledge of the 
mandatory rules and regulations governing ship’s safety and pollution prevention. 
ISM Code audits may only be performed by qualified auditors who have experience 
in ship operations or in relevant statutory and classification requirements.
The lACS expert working group on ISM which first met in 1993 identified the need 
for complete training programme for its auditors involved in certification. This was 
developed and implemented. It involves five modules which take a minimum of two 
weeks in addition to participating in actual audits, both of companies and ships. This 
lACS training programme is mandatory, the first time such a common training
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requirement has been made so for lACS members. The implementation of training is 
also audited under the lACS Quality System Certification Scheme.
3.3.3 Avoiding the conflict of interest between consultancy and certification
An lACS Member verifying ISM Code compliance must ensure that independence 
exists between personnel providing consultancy and those providing certification. 
Some shipping companies sometimes invited the employee of the lACS members to 
assist them to complete establishing the ISM systems, in that case, if the employee 
carried out the audits of the same shipping company as an ISM auditor, it means that 
he audited his own systems, in which case it is hard to ensure that the systems have 
met with the ISM requirements. Therefore, the activities of consultant and audits 
must be separated by the lACS Members.
However, it must be remembered that lACS members are acting as delegated agents 
for flag administrations. The ISM Code was not made by classification societies and 
it is not a classification rule. It was made by IMO members states as an amendment 
to the 1974 SOLAS Convention. Each member state, as a flag administration, is 
therefore responsible for its timely implementation. lACS is committed to supporting 
the flag states wherever possible and has played a full part in the development of the 
ISM Code over the past years.(James Bell, Fairplay, 1998)
The objective for lACS members has been to seek consistency and uniformity of 
implementation. Given the thousands of ships and hundreds of companies that are 
involved in the certification process, this is not an easy task.
3.4 shipping companies responsibility
When something goes wrong on board a ship, by tradition the master has been held 
responsible, while those back home in the boardroom usually escaped censure. The 
ISM Code is changing that by censuring that a shipping company’s management is 
held accountable for incidents involving its ships. It calls for companies to have 
safety management plans for every ship in their fleet and, because it has been ,made 
mandatory through the SOLAS Convention, the Code is also subject to port state 
control.(William A O’Neil, BIMCO review, 1999)
the ISM Code requires a company, which is defined as the owner of the ship or any 
other organisation or person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has 
assumed the responsibility of operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on 
assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and responsibility 
imposed by the Code, to set up their Safety Management System to address and 
document the following aspects of safety as identified in the ISM Code:
Safety and Environment Policy 
Company Responsibility and Authorities 
Appointing the “Designated Persons”
Master’s Responsibility and Authority 
Resources including Personnel 
Development of Plans for Shipboard operations 
Emergency preparedness
Reporting and Analysis of Non-conformance, Accidents, Hazardous Occurrence 
and Near Misses
Preventive Maintenance of Ship and Equipment 
Control of Documentation
Company Safety Verification, Review and Evaluation 
Third party Certification, Verification and Control
3.4.1 Safety and environment policy
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The first step is to set out the company’s objectives which will start with policies 
regarding safety and pollution prevention. The policies must be properly thought-out 
describing in a clear and concise manner how these objectives will be achieved and 
be imderstood at all levels within the organisation. It will also imderline the 
company’s commitment especially that of senior management. Just to say some nice 
words and thereafter do something else would be directly counterproductive.
3.4.2 Company responsibility and authority
The administrative structure of the company and the operating structure on board 
ship should be clearly identified including the inter-relationship of the various 
positions both ashore and afloat with special regard to the “Designated Persons 
ashore”. The company should ensure that adequate resources are made available and 
this will include financial, material and human resources. Every person who has 
responsibility or authority for safety matters must have these clearly defined in order 
that they can efficiently fulfil their tasks.
3.4.3 Designated Persons
For a Safety Management System to function effectively it is necessary for one 
person to co-ordinate and monitor all safety and pollution prevention matters both 
ashore and afloat. In large companies it may be necessary to split the fleet, in which 
case there can be more than one Designated Person Ashore(DPA). Where the DP A 
does not have overall authority, it is imperative that there is direct access to the 
highest level of management to ensure that any required action which is considered 
necessary will be taken by senior management in a timely manner.
3.4.4 Master’s responsibility and authority
The company must clearly define and document the Master’s responsibility and 
authority to ensure there is no misunderstanding especially in times of emergency. It 
is necessary to clearly establish that the Master has overriding authority and
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responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety of the crew, the vessel and 
pollution prevention and to expect the company’s full support and assistance 
following a major incident. The Master’s role in motivating the crew in safety 
matters must be established in the SMS and he should be given every encouragement 
and assistance in implementing the company’s policies and procedures and ensuring 
that the crew are well aware of the SMS and their part in its implementation.
3.4.5 Resources including Personnel
The company must ensure that adequate resources are made available to develop and 
maintain an effective Safety Management System. They will required to ensure that 
they appoint adequately qualified and experienced personnel both ashore and afloat 
and with special regard to the appointment of Masters.
3.4.6 Development of shipboard operations
Key shipboard operations involving safety of personnel and ship including pollution 
prevention should be identified and assigned to qualified and capable personnel with 
emphasis on preventive actions. Special and critical shipboard operations including 
contingency plans must be addressed and adequate procedures developed, 
implemented and recorded.
3.4.7 Emergency preparedness
Procedures and guidance instructions are required to be developed and made 
available to ensure that potential emergency situations can be dealt with quickly and 
effectively. Integrated contingency planning between shore and ship must be 
consistent to ensure the smoothest of operations during times of extreme pressure. 
Plans and drills for shore and shipboard contingencies should be reviewed at regular 
intervals and amended as necessary.
3.4.8 Reporting and analysis of non-conformances
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As effective SMS will rely on a concise procedure for reporting accidents, hazardous 
occurrences, near misses and non-conformances. Good feedback from all sections of 
the company and especially from the ships must be encouraged. Any deviation from 
the SMS procedures and instructions will require to be documented and reported to 
the shore-based management and evidence of effective corrective action having been 
taken must also be shown.
3.4.9 preventive maintenance
It is crucial to the success of the SMS that adequate provisions are made to ensure 
that as a minimum requirement, ships are maintained in accordance with statutory 
rules and regulations. Additional requirements to meet company standards should be 
established and clearly communicated to all personnel. The SMS should provide for 
specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of equipment and systems.
3.4.10 Documentation
The company should ensure that all docmnentation is controlled and that documented 
procedures and instructions are available for use at the relevant locations. That 
changes have been approved by authorised personnel and obsolete documents are 
withdrawn and properly disposed-of. Records must be readily available and retained 
in a manner that will ensure they do not suffer from deterioration.
3.4.11 Internal auditing and review
Internal audits of the Safety Management System must be carried out to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the policies , procedures and instructions, and to ensure that the 
system continues to be effective. The results of audits, non-conformance, analysis, 
corrective actions, reports and inspections require to be reviewed by senior 
management to ensure that the safety system is maintained and continually 
improved.
3.4.12 Certification, verification and control
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A Document of Compliance(DOC) should be issued to every company complying 
with the requirements of the ISM Code by the Administration, by an organisation 
recognised by the Administration or by the Government of the coimtry, acting on 
behalf of the Administration in which the company has chosen to conduct its 
business.
A Certificate, called a Safety Management Certificate, should be issued to a ship by 
the Administration or organisation recognised by the Administration which should 
periodically verify the proper fimctioning of the ship’s SMS as approved.
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Chapter 4 the Impact of the ISM Code on Limitation of Liability
4.1 General
Those outside the shipping and transportation business find it difficult to understand 
why shipowners and similar transporters should be in the uniquely privileged 
position of being able to limit their liability in respect of claims which are made 
against them. Why do shipowners and transporters enjoy this privilege? This right 
arises by operation of law and not by contract.
An eminent English judge summed up the position as follows:” limitation of liability 
is not a matter of justice. It is a matter of public policy which has its origin in history 
and its justification in convenience.’’(Richard Williams, 1997)
Legal limitation of the liability of shipowners for loss or damage arising on the 
connection with the operation of the ship has long traditions in international maritime 
law. Although the legal regimes have varied with time and place, they have two 
principles in common:
(1) the legal limit of liability varies, generally speaking, with the size of the ship, and
(2) the shipowner is not entitled to limit his liability if the damage is attributable to 
his personal fault or neglect.
4.2 Two types of limitation
Specific or contractual limitation includes the provisions in the various International 
Conventions covering carnage of goods and passengers by sea, namely the Hague 
Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules in respect of carriage of goods 
and the Athens Convention in respect of carriage of passengers. Also under the 
specific heading, there are other regimes established by the International 
Conventions in respect of oil pollution, nuclear liability and more recently HNS. The
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characteristic of this limitation is that it applies to specific types of claim. The 
specific or contractual limitation provisions broadly apply to “the carrier”, which 
includes the owner or charterer entering a contract with the shipper(Hague and 
Hague-Visby Rules), and any person by or in whose name a contract has been 
concluded with a shipper or who actually performs all or part of the 
carriage(Hamburg Rules and Athens Convention)
Global limitation relates to claims from all and any source and is generally applied 
after any applicable specific limitation provisions, although it does not apply at all to 
claims in respect of liability for oil pollution covered by the Civil Liability 
Convention(CLC) where the limitation regimes are totally independent and stand 
alone. There have been two international conventions setting out this type of 
limitation-the 1957 Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners 
of Seagoing Ships(the 1957 Convention) which is now of fairly limited application 
and the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976( the 1976 
Convention) which is increasingly becoming the international standard.
The difference between these two conventions is broadly that the 1957 Convention 
provides for lower limits but it is easier for a claimant to challenge and break the 
limit whereas the 1976 Convention provides for higher limits( soon to be 
substantially increased when the 1996 Protocols come into force internationally) but 
those limits are much more difficult to challenge.
4.3 “The actual fault or privity” standard
the actual fault or privity standard exists in the 1957 Convention. This convention is 
no longer in force in England, nor in most other English law based jurisdictions, 
although it still applies in Singapore. The right to limit liability imder the 1957 
Convention is granted to a shipowner “ unless the occurrence giving rise to the claim 
resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner”. In England the burden of
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proving the absence of fault or privity has lain on the owner(it is always particualrly 
difficult to prove a negative), whereas the civil law system in Europe and elsewhere 
have placed the burden of proving the existence of fault or privity on the claimant 
seeking to break limitation.
The meaning of “actual fault or privity of the owner” has been the subject of much 
litigation before the courts.
The primary problem has been to establish who, in law, constituted the “owner”. 
This was a particularly difficult question where the vessel concerned owned by a 
company. The problem was solved in most countries that adopted the Convention by 
the development of the concept of the “alter ego”. This concept first saw light of day 
in the United Kingdom in the Lennard’s Carrying Co. case where the court was 
required to consider the problem in the context of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 
The court held that, upon the true construction of section 503 of the MSA 1894, the 
“fault or privity” must be the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely a 
servant or agent for whom the company is liable but somebody for whom the 
company is liable because his action is very action of the company itself (Patrick 
Griggs, 1986)
According to Professor Robert Grime’s view in his article “ The loss of the right to 
limit”, the “actual fault” of a shipowning company included: a fault brought home to 
the Board of Director; the fault of proven “alter ego”, who need not be a Board 
member; and the fault of a person, partnership or company which is either a 
registered ship’s manager or to whom management has been wholly delegated. 
Faults of other will not be the actual fault of the company, but if the delegation of 
responsibility to another was improper, faulty or not sufficient supervised, then the 
act of delegation might itself be accovmted the actual fault of the shipowning 
company.
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What is the exact meaning of privity? Privity means actual positive knowledge or 
“turning a blind eye” as Lord Denning said in the Eurysthenes in 1976. When we talk 
about privity of the owner, there are many phrases used to describe the individual 
who represents the corporate body. Phrases such as “the directing mind and well”, 
“the very ego”, the person “for whom the company is liable because his action is the 
very action of the company itself’.
The requirement in Article 4 of the ISM Code for the appointment of a designated 
person with access to the highest levels of management, and with express duties to 
monitor the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the operation of each ship, will 
make it impossible for a owner of a vessel claiming limitation of liability under the 
1957 Convention to prove the absence of fault or privity if the problems which gave 
rise to the casualty were already known to the designated person. It seems likely that 
knowledge and records of that designated person may be available to aid claimants in 
civil law countries to prove the existence of fault or privity.
On the other hand, the existence of a complete set of ISM Code documentation and 
certificates may actually make it easier for a shipowner seeking limitation of liability 
in those common law countries where the 1957 Convention still applies to prove the 
absence of fault or privity. The ISM Code may therefore bring the application of the 
1957 Convention in those civil law and English law countries where it still applies 
more closely into line.
4.4 Under the 1976 Limitation Convention
The drafting of Article 4 of this Convention was deliberately intended to make the 
loss of the right to limitation of liability much more difficult to prove in order to 
counterbalance the substantially increased limits introduced by the Convention . 
Article 4 reads: ‘
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“A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it proved that the loss 
resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such 
loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.”
It is well known that a heavier burden of proof is required under the new system of 
limitation to break limitation as compared with the old system. For a claimant to 
break limitation not only does Article 4 require proof that the loss claimed resulted 
from a personal act or omission of the legal person of the ship owning company but 
also that it was committed either with intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and 
with knowledge that such loss would probably result, in other words, the legal person 
of the company must have anticipated the likelihood of the loss, but nevertheless 
acted or failed to act regardless of that probability. Therefore, mere negligence or 
even gross negligence is no longer sufficient to break the right to limitation because 
the right to be lost there must be intention to cause loss or damage or recklessness.
There has been no decided case on Article 4 since the 1976 Convention came into 
force in 1986, but the question of whose “personal act or omission” will be relevant 
in the case of a corporate shipowner has been the subject of academic comment, in a 
recent case in the Privy Council on another issue. Meridian Global v. Securities 
Commission it was held by their Lordships that the relevant “Rules of Attribution” 
must be identified from the true construction of the governing statute or 
convention.(RICHARD SHAW, 1998)
The 1976 Convention expressly provides that it is only the “personal” act or 
omission of the person liable which will defeat the right to limit. However, it is still 
necessary to consider in the case of corporations whose act or omission will be 
treated as the “personal” act or omission which may defeat the right to limit. Thus it 
seems that the concept of the alter ego co-opted from the law developed from the 
limitation provisions of the 1894 MSA will have to be applied in order to ascertain 
whose action is the very action of the company itself.
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4.4.1 The “personal liable”
Article 4 of the 1976 Convention speaks of the “personal” act or omission of a 
“personal liable” which term presumably encompasses all the various parties 
identified in Article 1 which is headed:” persons entitled to limit liability”. 
Therefore, a “person liable” could be the shipowner, the charterer, manager, 
operator, salvor or liability insurer of the vessel or a fiirther class of person defined 
as “ any person for whose act, neglect or default the shipowner or salvor is 
responsible”.
Whose “personal” act will defeat the right to limit? The personal act of any one of 
the different persons identified in Article 1 will prevent him fi:om limiting his own 
liability in the event of a claim against him but will not necessarily defeat the right to 
limit any other persons in the same group in the event of a claim against them. 
Therefore, if losses arose as a result of the personal act of a ship’s manager he would 
not be able to limit liability in the event of a successful claim against him whereas 
the shipowner might be able to limit since the act or omission would not be 
necessarily be “personal” to him. But the close relationship which frequently exists 
between the management and ownership structures the distinction may not be so 
clear cut since the alter ego of both “persons” might well be the same.
It is clear from Article 1.1.2 of the ISM Code that the Code identifies within the term 
of “company” the owner of the ship and any organisation including a professional 
manager or bareboat charterer who has assumed the responsibility for operation of 
the ship from the shipowner. The question* arises therefore as to whether the 
“personal fault” of such a manager would be imputed to the owner in the context of a 
limitation action under the 1976 Convention.
A professional ship manager will probably be the employer of the designated person 
under the ship’s SMS. If that person is found to be at fault, but the true owner
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remains ignorant of the problem despite having acted reasonably in appointing a 
competent ship manager, then it would be unfair to deprive the owner of limitation of 
liability. The wording of the 1976 Convention does not help much, but the insertion 
of the word “personal”, which does not appear in other conventions containing 
clauses worded similarly to Article 4 suggests a rule of Attribution pointing very 
specially to the owner himself, or to the person in a corporate ownership most closely 
corresponding to the individual shipowner.
4.4.2 “Intent to cause such loss”
It is clear from these words that in order to deprive the “personal liable” of the right 
to limit, it must be proved that the “persona liable” had the subjective intent to cause 
the loss. It is not sufficient to prove that a reasonably competent person could not 
have not failed to conclude that his act or omission would cause the loss. It must be 
shown that the “person liable” himself actively intended the loss. It is difficult to 
imagine how anybody could prove this because to do so it would almost seem to be 
necessary to explore the mind of the party who had committed the act or expose that 
person to truth drugs or some equally infallible method of exposing the true 
intentions of the person concerned.
4.4.3 “Recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result”
The meaning of the word “recklessly” or “recklessness” has been construed by the 
courts in the United kingdom in a number of cases such as R.v. Caldwell and R.v. 
Lawrence Stephen. It connotes either carelessness or utter heedlessness of 
consequence with the result that the perpetrator is deemed to have considered neither 
the probability or even the possibility of a likely result.(Patrick Griggs, 1986)
Guidance may be sought in the case of Goldman v Thai airway International 
Ltd(1983). The Court of Appeal said that the word “recklessly” had to be construed
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in Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention along with the words “and with knowledge 
that damage would probably result”. Eveleigh LJ stated at page 700 that:
“An act may be reckless when it involves risk, even though it can not be said the 
danger envisaged is a probable consequence. It is enough that it is a possible 
consequence, although there comes a point when the risk is so remote that it would 
not be considered reckless to take it. We look for an element of recklessness which is 
perhaps more clearly indicated in the French term “temerairement”. Article 25 
however, refers not to possibility, but to the probability of resulting damage. Thus 
something more than a possibility is required . The word “probable” is a common 
enough word. I understand that to mean something is likely to happen. I think that 
that is what is meant in Article 25. In other words, one anticipates damage from the 
act or omission.”
4.5 the Effect of the ISM Code
It is doubtful that the ISM Code will have a significant effect upon a shipowner’s 
right to limit under the 1976 Convention. Leaving aside the possibility of deliberate 
intent, the claimant must show that the loss resulted from personal act or omission of 
the shipowner committed recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would 
probably result. Rule 4 of the ISM Code establishes a link between the safe operation 
of the ship and the highest level of management in the shipowning or operating 
company. Therefore, where the wrongful act in question consists of, or arises out of 
, a breach of the ISM Code, it should be easier to prove a “personal act or omission” 
on the part of the shipowner. The claimant is still left with the tasks of proving 
“recklessness” and “knowledge that such loss would probably result”.
If the shipowner has failed to correct a shortcoming aboard the vessel which must 
have been apparent from the documents that the Code requires to be produced, the 
courts may be prepared to regard such failures as “reckless”
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Wording that is remarkably similar to that of the 1976 Limitation Convention also 
appears in the Hague Rules. It will thus be similarly difficult for a claimant to 
establish that a carrier is not entitled to limit his liability under the Hague Rules.
It is clear however that the advent of the ISM Code will require management 
arrangements to be more transparent, and more subject to regular scrutiny that 
hitherto, and this may expose owners to a great risk of challenge to their right to 
limitation of liability.
The ISM Code must now represent the internationally recognised standard of good 
ship management, and failure to comply with the Code’s principles(not just failure to 
produce a DOC and SMC) will amoimt to a lack of due diligence by the owner. 
Moreover, Articles 9 and 10.2 of the Code requires the owner to establish procedures 
for the reporting , investigation and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and 
hazardous occiurence. It appears probable that cargo interests will be encouraged by 
these requirements to demand discovery of all such records and documents relating 
to a ship on which a claim has arisen and possibly her sister ship.
4.6 The Designated Person(DP)
With the purpose of preventing or minimising the occurrence of marine accidents 
resulting from human error, and emphasising the onshore management, the new 
regime introduced by the Code is the “Designated Person”(DP) in article 4 as 
follows:
“To ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the 
company and those onboard, every company, as appropriate, should designate a 
person or persons shore having direct access to the highest level of management. 
The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons should include
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monitoring the safety and pollution aspects of the operation of each ship and 
ensuring the adequate resource and a shore-based support are applied, as required.”
This Article has created a totally new post within any shipowning or operating 
company. It is believed that this post and function is not only a very responsible one 
but also very delicate. The DP has the responsibility and authority for ensuring that 
the objectives and requirements of the SMS are earned out. Non-conformities will be 
reported directly to the designated person who has direct access to the highest level 
of management. A non-conformity is defined as a deviation from the requirements 
specified on the owner’s SMS. In many cases, unseaworthiness.
The future will show that there is considerable room for argument, how far the 
responsibility of the DP goes as far as safety and environment pollution prevention is 
concerned. He or she will be the link between the company and those on board. In 
past times this was the superintendent. The person appointed as the DP is required to 
be able to speak and understand the language that is spoken on board and has direct 
access to the highest level of management. In addition, according to the ICS 
Guidelines, the DP should meet the following requirements:
“ The designated person(s) should be suitably qualified and experienced in the safety 
and pollution control aspects of ship operations and should be fully conversant with 
the company’s safety and environmental protection policies.
The designated person should have the independence and authority to report 
deficiencies observed to the highest level of management.”
The pitfall may lie in the management not taking the DP seriously. According to the 
requirements of the ISM Code, any information about inadequacies in safety and 
environment pollution prevention may be attributed to the management, who can not 
escape the responsibility if he or she failed to be active response or only turned “a 
blind eye” on the deficiencies that the DP has reported. However, the DP also has to 
be alert as well as to a failure on his part to provide for the adequate resources and
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shore based support, which may impose a personal liability on him. If a DP performs 
his job properly and skilfully- as the traditional superintendent did, this will be a 
rewarding position, giving him satisfaction that he personally not only contributed to 
but also provided for the safety of his seafaring colleagues and also the integrity of 
the ship and cargo or passenger carried.
What is the legal position of the DP? What is the legal consequence o^the DP’s 
personal act or omission? In other words, could the DP’s personal act or mission 
result the shipowner losing his right to limit liability? Another question to be asked 
is whether the knowledge acquired by the designated person or persons about 
deficiencies in a ship or the management practice of the relevant company in the 
exercise of his duties could amount to knowledge of the highest level of management 
of the company. Some people said that the DP is part of that management and his 
action can represent “ the direct mind and well” of the company, therefore, his 
personal act or mission could make the shipowner no right to limit liability.
The author has the totally different views from the above mentioned. Firstly, the DP 
is not part of the management, he is lower down the authority chain with the specific 
task of monitoring the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the ship operation 
as well as ensuring that adequate resource and shore-based support are applied. If 
doing his job properly, he will get large number of information from the ships much 
of which will stay with him and some of which will be commimicated to others 
laterally in the organisation of action, and some of which will be reported to his 
superiors. Secondly, the DP’s personal act or omission shall not defeat the 
shipowner’s right of limitation of liability. According to Article 4 of the 1976 
Convention, a personal liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it proved that 
the loss resulted from his “personal” act or mission, in other words, if loss arose as a 
result of the personal act of the DP, he would not be able to limit his liability, which 
can not affect the right of the shipowner to limit his liability because the act or 
omission would not be necessarily the shipowner’s personal act or omission.
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However, the new regime of the DP can make the operation of the ship more 
transparency and also force the shipowner unable to turn a blind eye for the non­
conformities existing in the SMS, otherwise it might threat his right of limitation of 
his liability.
For example, the problem of crew fatigue on board the ship due to lack of competent 
officers has been reported to the DP, who has reported this non-conformity to the 
top management . However, the shipowner failed to take appropriate corrective 
actions timely, one day there was a collision accident occurring on the specific ship 
and resulted loss of life as well as serious marine pollution. Investigation indicated 
the accident was caused by the duty officer falling asleep on the bridge due to 
excessive work and lack of sleep, in other words, there was a causal link between 
the lack of competent officers on board ship and the collision. In that case, the 
claimant was easy to prove that the loss resulted from the shipowner’s personal 
omission committed with recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would 
probably result and further could break the shipowner right of limitation of his 
liability. According to Article 10.2 of the ISM Code, the company should ensure that. 
“ inspections are held at appropriate intervals; any non-conformity is reported, with 
its possible cause, if known; appropriate corrective action is taken; and records of 
these activities are maintained.” Therefore it is favour of the claimant to find the 
evidence if there is the shipowner’s personal act or omission through these records 
when an accident occurring.
There is no doubt that requirements of the ISM code to document thoroughly all 
measures following an incident will provide a fertile ground for legal disputes in the 
years to come.
Chapter 5 The Impact on the Marine Insurance
Shipping is one of the highest risk industries in the world. During the routine 
operation of ships, they will encounter all kinds of risks not only from the sea but 
also from the human beings. Heavy weather, rough sea, grounding, collisions and 
fire etc. will result in loss of life, personal injury, damage to property and/or serious 
pollution to the environment especially to the marine enviroiunent; at the same time, 
maritime fraud and piracy etc. , man-made disasters, are also likely threat to the 
sustainable development of the shipping industry. Therefore, it is necessary for all 
parties engaged in the shipping business to insure their properties as well as their 
liabilities against the negative consequences of such disasters. They can keep the 
shipping business running by sharing the risks among them through the insurance.
The entry into force of ISM Code is to ensure safety at sea, the prevention of human 
injury or loss of life and the avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to 
the marine environment and to the property. The ISM Code can affect several 
aspects of marine insurance. It has some potential impacts on the insurance rules, 
seaworthiness, duty of disclosure and cover.
5.1 Change of rules
The Intemational Group clubs made recommendations to their member clubs to 
change the rules to support the implementation of the ISM Code. The 
recommendations were that club rules should be changed to achieve at least three 
criteria: firstly, the possession of valid ISM Code certificates in accordance with 
flag state requirements would be obligatory as a term of the insurance; secondly the 
uncertificated member would be denied the right to recover claims arising from 
failure to comply with flag state ISM Code requirements. And finally clubs would 
include, in their existing programmes of ships visits and inspections, checks that
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there was an effective safety management system in operation and in compliance 
with ISM Code requirements.(Fairplay, 1998)
The rules of all International Group P&I clubs will contain a provision that the 
entered vessel shall comply with statutory requirements. Skuld Club rules have been 
amended to read;
“The member shall comply with all statutory requirements of the state of the vessel’s 
flag, relating to the construction, adaptation, condition, fitment, equipment, manning, 
operation and management of the entered vessel(including applicable requirements 
of the ISM Code) and maintain the validity of all statutory certificates issued by or 
on behalf of the vessel’s flag state in relation to such requirements. In the event of 
any failiure to comply with this requirement (whether or not the member has been 
negligent), the member shall not be entitled to any recovery from the Association, 
except insofar as the member can prove that liabilities, losses, expenses or costs 
would have been incurred in any event and would have been covered by the 
Association if the member had complied with those requirements...’’(Skuld, 1999)
Skud(and some other clubs have publicly said the same) also will decline to accept as 
new members any shipowners that do not have valid ISM certificates as required by 
the vessel’s flag state.
A new clause was introduced in the cargo insurance by London’s cargo underwriters 
in May 1998 as an active step to support what the ISM Code is trying to achieve. 
The Joint Cargo Committee(JCC) of Lloyd’s and the Institute of London 
Underwriters(ILU) have devised and circulated a new clause within the market, 
which is being recommended as an ISM endorsement. According the new clause, 
cargo owners who are aware of or should ha\^been aware thaLthe insured cargojs 
carried by a non-ISM compliant vessel or whose owners/operatois do npi hold_a 
DOC will^i^ ins.urance cover from jcargoamderwriters—However, irmocent cargo
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insured who may unwittingly find their cargoes on non-certified vessels are still be 
entitled to recover from their cargo underwriters.
5.2 Unseaworthiness and cover
The traditional legal basis of carriage of goods by sea, and of insurance for P&I 
liabilities, is the owner’s duty to exercise “due diligence” to make sure a vessel is 
seaworthy. The principle was introduced by the US Harter Act in 1893 and embodied 
in the Hague and HagueA^isby rules. Article 3 of the HagueA^isby rules stated that “ 
the carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to:
• Make the ship seaworthy;
• Properly man, equip and supply the ship;
• Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in 
which the goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation.”
As far as the impact of the ISM Code on due diligence is concerned, the requirement 
of the Code that all procedures be the subject of documentation will inevitably 
provide more chance and means to find an act or omission on thejpar^q^f the 
shipowner that will ground liability or lend support to contentions being advanced in 
litigation. The ISM Code provides a firamework for detailed procedure with regard 
to^ aspects of ship management, maintenance and operations. Failure to abide by 
these requirements may result in inference as to what of due diligence on the part of 
the shipowner.
While the requirements of the ISM Code that each company must keep records of 
orders and instructions to its crew, ensure their adequate understanding of rules, 
regulations and guidelines, keep documentation of all activities in a safety 
management manual, and delegate the monitoring of safety and pollution prevention
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aspects to a designated person will provide evidence of exercise of due diligence 
under the HagueA/’isby rule, equally any non-compliance with the Code or 
deficiencies in the operational system of a company will undoubtedly provide 
ammunition to the opposition.
Although the Code is not directly concerned with issues of civil liability and the 
insurance, it is inevitable that it will have a significant inipagt^njhev^yjui^^ 
the^carrier.’^ liability is assjgs§£dJjUh&jy^ or_^ereJher^,loss or
Hamape tn cargo. Among the issues of ciYilJhahiIilv>„ssamd;hffie§sislheo^  ^
might be most affected.
/Seaworthiness is covered in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules, charter 
parties and marine insurance policies. The traditional test is that, for a vessel to be 
j seaworthy, it “ must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary, careful and 
\ prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage 
I having regard to all the probable circumstances of it.(Mc Fadden v Blue Star Line, 
1905).
The impact of the ISM Code will be in the following aspects:
First, it is normal to expect that vessels are in possession of documents which b^on 
their seaworthiness, such as certificates required by the law of the flag state or by the 
laws, regulations and lawful practices of the government and local authorities at the 
vessel’s ports of call. Failure to possess necessary documentation, including those 
provided by the Code could amount to unseaworthiness.
Second, even if a satisfactory SMS is in place, but the owner or operator has,„^^^ 
live up to it on the occasion in question, this may result in arguments either that the 
ship is seaworthy due to the SMS ndt being implemented properly, or that the owner 
failed to properly care for the cargo. It would be wrong to say that the Safety 
Management Certificate was merely an additional certificate for inspection.
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The Hague-Visby Rules require that for liability to be shown not only was the vessel 
unseaworthy but the unseaworthiness resulted from a lack of due diligence on the 
part of the shipowner.
According to this rul^j^^ownersythat fulfil this obligation were not liable for crew
errors in navigation or maintenance. Cargo interests have rarely attempted the 
difficult task of proving negligence on the part of shore management. However, the 
Code’s requirement for a continuous interface at top management level between ship 
and shore places a strict responsibility on senior management to ensure that safety 
systems are maintained and documented throughout the voyage. This means failure 
to provide a proper system for thejvessels’ management and operation may well
amount to “unseaworthniess”. The owner will no longer be able to plead “I did my 
best, I didn’t know the ship wasn’t seaworthy.” Furthermore, th^junderwriters-may 
successfully argue that non-compliance _ with—ISM—CQdfi..„jnay amount to 
rmseaworthiness, and it will be harder to jet the recovery from the underwriters.
In addition, under the Code these defences will no longer be available where the loss 
is caused by a failure of safety management. The ISM chain of command to top C> f* 
management through a designated person precludes a plea of ignorance. Either the 
owner or the designated person will have known: or if they did not, they would be in 
breach of the Code.
There is an undeniable connection between rules to improve maritime safety and 
issues of unseawo’rthiness. The comprehensive nature of the new requirements makes 
it easier to link unseaworthiness with failure in compliauce. Unseaworthiness can be 
proved in any instance where proper maintenance is not planned, whfire..planned 
maintenance is not carried out, or where simlar defects have been detected in the 
past on the same .ship.x)iu)ii.simila]ijship. but have not bee.n_rectifiedJ3]lihe vessel in 
question. The Code’s hidden burdens on owners will make it harder for clubs to 
avoid or minimise liability for cargo claims.
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The consequence of unseaworthiness has been very serious impact on the insured 
and usually would amount to the insured losing of right to recover any loss or 
damages resulted from unseaworthiness. For example, Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
Section 39(5) stated; Where, with the privity of the insured, the ship is sent to 
sea in an unseaworthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to 
imseaworthiness.”
Among all implied warranties in marine insurance, the most important one is the 
implied warrancty in any voyage policy that the ship will be seaworthy when the risk 
commence. With respect of time policy, there is no such implied warranty of
CKAO&fH.' a_i^
seaworthness, except that if with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in 
an unseaworthy state, the underwriters are free from liability for any loss attributable 
to such unseaworthiness.
It can be seen that issues(of^aworthines^will therefore be directly relevant to an 
owner’s ability to recover under both a voyage and a time policy. The Code is 
likely to have a direct impact on these issues. First it may be used as a yardsticlTfor 
ascertaining whether the ship is indeed unseaworthy. And secondly, it may have an 
img^loii the question of whether the owner was privity to this.
In addition to the newly introduced designated person regime. Article 9 of the Code 
provides that the onboard Safety Management System(SMS) should include 
procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are 
reported to the company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving 
safety and pollution prevention. And the company should establish procedures for 
the implementing of corrective action. Failure of reporting, investigating, analysing 
and correcting these non-conformities may amount to turning a blind eye, and result 
in constituting privity to unseawothiness on the part of the shipowner.
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The Code requires that the designated person reports to the highest levels of 
management, and also requires that the highest levels of management enquire of the 
designated person what problem exist and what action is being taken. It is therefore 
impossible for an onerating.jc.cmiianY-tajdalm ignoraa.c.e_.Qrany problem that may 
lead to unseaworthiness in a vessel. Failure to be aware is no longer a mitigating...  ^ _■ ^1^11 I —^ X
circumstance for the operator. On the contrary it becomes an evidence of unsafe 
operation because the ISM Code has 1^ down an industry standard that should 
make ignorance upposahlfi.-
Before entering into a contact of insurance, it is important for the insurer to obtain
important that the apparent scope of risk does not change significantly during the 
insurance contract’s duration.
The person effecting insurance and/or the assured plays a central role in supplying 
information regarding risks, and change of risks, of the item or interest. Moreover, 
the same person may increase the risk of encountering an insured accident through 
his actions or failure to take actions. Therefore, it is important for the insurer to 
obtain correct disclosure from the insured.
The duty of disclosure of the insured means the duty of the person effecting 
insurance to make correct representation and full and complete disclosme as to 
circumstance which are material when the insurer is to decide, if and under what 
conditions, he will undertake the insurance. If the duty of disclosure has been 
breached, the insurer normally has the right to end the contractual relationship for the 
future.
5.3 Disclosure anc
the best available information about the risk to be undertaken. At the same time, it is
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The specific requirements of the disclosure written in the rule 28.1.1 of Skuld are as 
follows;
The member shall make full and correct disclosure to the Association, before the 
contract of insurance is concluded, of every circm|^t^^
(a) which is known to the member or any agent effecting the insurance on his behalf, 
or which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by the member or 
agent and
(b) which would influence the Association in deciding whether and what terms to 
provide cover.
According to the ISM Code requirements, all deficiencies found during the routine 
operation of the ship must be recorded and also be required to report to the shore- 
based management of the company. The company has an obligation to carry out 
safety audits. The results of the safety audits should be brought to the attention of all 
personnel having responsibility in the area involved so that timely corrective actions
can be taken on any non-conformities found. It is obviously that the reporting and 
auditing^stem will make the operation of the ship much more transpajept. This is 
thought to be especially so in relation to the designated person and his direct access 
to the top management.
The shipping company must disclose full and complete material information to the
insurer at the time of making the contract of insurance. Especially he qr_shejmust 
disclose all deficiencies-ofthe-SMS-and defeats that he should know existing during 
the operation of the ship because-hq.or_she has„no^e^u^Jp_:^tq_teo]^hese 
deficiencies according the ISM Code.
A purpose of the ISM Code is to establish a chain of command leading up the 
“highest level of management” of a shipowning or operating company andjbc_eyery 
person in that c-b^in with a degree of responsibility for monitoring safety procedures 
aboard the vesself As a re^r^t^ill.b^comejnpje diff^^^^ a-person or persons
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who comprise the alter egqjiCihjei‘loamanagement” of an ins^ed^company to claim 
that they “did not know of defects aboacdihe vessel.
A situation which may frequently happen is that, although the owner has obtained all 
necessary ISM documents and certificates, he failed to disclose to his insurers some 
defects in the SMS or in its implementation, which should have been disclosed and 
which in due course become apparent from a review of the ship’s ISM records 
following a casualty and a claim on the policy, or which is discovered during port 
state control inspection. In such circumstances, the insurer may be liable to avoid his 
liability under the policy.
more complicated situation will arise if the potential member informs the club that 
he has DOC and SMC in place, but later on it appears that this is not correct. If 
incorrect information was given and the insured can, in one way or another, be 
blamed for giving such incorrect information, then there would be no cover if the 
insurer would not have written the risk, had the correct information been disclosed.
5.4 Non-conformity and cover
If a vessel has been gitered when the owners or managers have their DOC in place 
and the vessel its SMC, then there is a continuous obligation on the member to 
comply with all the statutory requirements of the flag state of the vessel including the 
applicable requirements of the ISM Code.
^ P&I insurance is a liability insurance and the whole idea of the cover is for the 
insured member to have insurance in place for errors and omissions made by the 
employees such as the captain, officers or the crew, for which the member can be 
held li^le. The introduction of the ISM Code dPfiaJiotchaageJthiS-aJLall. It is still the 
intention to provide cover Jo a member for the captain’s breach of instructions in 
relation to what he has to do before leaving a port, or an engine officer’s breach of
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instructions in relation to bunkering of the vessel. This would be irrespective of such 
breaches being seen pbsequently by an auditor as non-conformities.(Hans Levy, 
BMCO, 1998) r J ^
However, if a non-conformity is reported to the member and he does not take any 
steps to rectify the non-conformity or, if the member turns a blind eye by not 
ensming that a system is in place where non-conformities are reported to him, then 
the member shall not be entitled to any recovery from the Association except in so 
far as the member can prove that liabilities, losses, expenses and costs would have 
been incurred in any event according to Sl^Mmle 29.1T0^
(This rule apply whether or not the member has been negligent. On the other 
harrdTifironly applicable to losses where there is a causal relation between the loss 
and the member’s non-conformity. In other words, the losses where there is no such 
causal relation will still be covered by the club.
The rule in relation to compliance with fSM is not different from the one with respect 
to the member’s obligations to comply with other statutory requirements. But the 
reporting requirements of the ISM Code will make it easier to investigate the extent 
to which the member has followed up on reported non-conformities, and also if the 
^^ember has cared whether such_non::CQ^liiJi£^^ reported to him. It is
^ that there will some cases where the consequences .of .thcLmemherls
faihir£lcu::ornplY vdth the ISM Code will lead to,no recovery from the club.
Although the ISM Code has several aspectsJojaffect the marine insurance, it will not 
be used by P&I club and underwriters as an .excuse for refusing or delaying the 
payment of valid claims. Over the last few years we have seen both a reduction in 
hull losses and that P&I claims have stabilised. Perhaps the preppation for the ISM 
Code is part .oXihe^^reasomforthis so that to a certain degree the objectives of the 
.XlndediaveJjeeiialre^^ reached.
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5 Evidence
When a claim arises, questions ,are_.aslad^sJxx^iiether the ship was seaworthy, 
whether the carrier failed to care for the goods, whether the crew were competent, 
whether the limitation could be broken, and whether the underwriters and or P&I 
insurance could pull cover legally. In order to solve these issues, the claimant seeks 
disclosure of those documents in the owner’s possession which go to demonstrate 
how well the vessel has been maintained, how well qualified were the crew, when 
was the last class survey and how safety was managed both on board the vessel and 
ashore. Before the Code came into force, it was difficult to get sufficient documents
for these purposes.
The most important aspect of the Code is the fact that each shipping company must 
now have a written document in which its policies and instructions to its crew will be 
written and clear lines of communications between the ship and shore-based 
management exists.
Furthermore, records of all reports to and from the ship and the designated person 
must be kept. This system of transparency would allow interested parties to go 
through these records and scrutinise the whole management system of a company. 
This recording of information will allow more details to find their way to courts to 
provide evidence on the facts of each particular case. The types of documents that 
could interest potential claimants include:
• Documents relating to frequency of inspections
• Documents showing non-conformity together with reports of any known or 
probable causes
• Documents indicating corrective actions and results
• Documents recording the maintenance of such activities
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Documents illustrating the crew’s history, ongoing training and competence for 
their current jobs
If these documents are asked for and not provided, this may prejudice the owner, as 
the absence will reflect badly on the owner. He will not merely be able to say that the 
documents have been retained or have been lost, since Article 2 of the Code requires
the company to establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data
I ^which are relevant to the SMS. ^
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
The purpose of the Code is to ensure safe practice in ship operation, to safeguard 
against identified risks, to improve safety management skills of personnel and thus 
achieve a substantial decrease in or even elimination of substandard and dangerous 
ships.
Briefly, the Code aims to reduce human error and improve management on shore by 
introducing mandatory rules and regulations for systematic operational system and 
procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the Code. It requires a 
designated person or persons, having direct access to the highest level of 
management, to be appointed ashore and have responsibility and authority to 
monitor aspects of safety and pollution prevention and ensure that adequate resource 
including shore-based support are applied.
The ISM Code is an important step in the right direction. Main element of the ISM 
Code is to establish a safety system involving the ship as well as the shofe-based 
personnel, including certain procedures and documentation in connection with the 
implementation and maintenance of the Safety Management System(SMS).
The ISM Code requires that the minimum standard to be met by a careful shipowner 
based on the existing doctrine of due diligenge^"Whatls hew isithat lEe~sMpowner is 
now obliged to establish that a system exists to secure that due diligence is exerted 
und-juaintainpd -^oth on board the vessel and ashore, and that routines are 
established to follow up and to report any so called non-conformities, accidents and
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hazardous situations, with the objective of improving safety and pollution 
prevention.
The ISM Code seems “j^er tiger” unless it is implemented fully and effectively by 
the shipowner as well as flag states. It is the shipowner’s primary responsibility to 
establish the Safety Management System(SMS) and ensure this system is really 
working both on board the vessels and shore, otherwise it is just creating additional 
certificates for inspection. Shipowners, Flag states. Classification Society and port 
State shall work together and maintain co-operation to ensure that the ISM Code can 
be well implemented and all goals of the ISM Code will be achieved, namely
Meanwhile, the ISM Code has some legal impacts on shipowner’s civil liability 
related for loss or damage to cargoes, on the limitation of the shipowner’s liability 
and on the insurance.
/
The ISM Code sets un another standard to assess whether the ship i|^awoith^^ the 
comaeiKfi-a£Jhe_vjoyageyyilhihft,ex^^Q^Jia-diligenceLhyJhft.ihipowner.J^- 
conformity of the ISM Code woulxLamojLjnt To unseaworthiness and consequently 
make the shipowner be unable to escape the liability for the loss or damage to the 
cargoes resulted from the unseaworthiness. It has been said that the introduction and 
implementation of the ISM Code will make the job easier for the courts, as the judge 
will now have available first hand evidence as to whether tHe shore-based operation 
and the routines oh board were organisedHin^dili^ehTwajrThexourt would also be 
able to compare a shipowner’s operation with the^xretingmiiHinuun standard of due 
diligence in order to evaluate his performance.
The Code is not directly concerned with the shipowner’s ability to limit liability to a 
particular figure xmder any limitation conventions. However, the standard of
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supervision and management required by the Code is bound to have an effect on 
assessing “actual fault or privity” or “recklessness” in the limitation cases.
Implementation of the Code will make it easier to establish actual fault or privity on 
the part of the owner. It is a clear obligation for the top management of any 
shipowing company to put an SMS into place, but not merely put onboard. 
Therefore, having set up an SMS and trained the crew to abide with it may not be a 
defence for the owner to discharge such a duty.
In litigation, it is the shipowner on whom the burden of proving the absence of fault 
or privity is placed. Fulfilment of the Code could be very helpful for the owner to do 
so. Otherwise, disclosure of the Code-inspired documentation will assist the claimant 
to challenge this.
It is more difficult to prove the owner’s recklessness, and a mere failure to comply 
with the requirements of the ISM Code will seldom be sufficient for this purpose. 
However, the reporting procedure, the designated person regime and the 
documentation required by the Code will draw away the owner’s defence of not 
being aware. If he does not know, he is not applying the standard of prudence an 
average shipowner should demonstrate. If the senior management then deliberately 
ignores or turns a blind eye to serious problems, the owner could be held to have 
been reckless.
P &I clubs rules contain a provision that vessels entered shall comply with the 
utory requirements. As the ISM Code forms a part of SOLAS, the lack of the 
necessary certification under the ISM Code will result in the termination or waiver of 
the cover. This will be the position, irrespective of the fact the vessel is actually in 
class and her technical condition in other respects satisfies the club’s requirements. 
Non-certification can be described as a lack of formal compliance with the ISM 
Code. Lack of compliance might be the failure by the shore-based operation to give
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instructions or follow up that instructions are complied with. Other examples are 
inadequate or obsolete reporting procedures, lack of, or insufficient, instructions by 
the master, training of the crew and reporting systems to the shore-based operations.
^e ISM Code, with its detailed documentation system, will have a direct impact on 
proving that the vessel was seaworthy as of the moment of the attachment of the 
insurance and the vessel owner did not knowingly permit the vessel to break ground 
in an unseaworthy condition.
The ISM Code requires that non-conformities be reported by the master to the 
company. It also provides for the recording and alleviation of deficiencies. It requires 
extensive internal safety audits which must be brought to the attention of all 
personnel having responsibility in the area involved and requires that management 
persoimel take timely corrective action on deficiencies found. Although the gaol is to 
correct deficiencies, their very record could give rise to a claim by an insurer that the 
vessel was not seaworthy at the time the insurance attached if any deficiencies 
existed at that time.
The ISM code requires such extensive documentation of shipboard operations, it may 
provide the owner with a greater ability to prove due diligence that he had in the past. 
On the other hand, because of reporting of non-conformities, deficiencies and so 
forth, unless the documentation is carefully crafted, the ISM code may haveJlie 
opposite result and_gjyjmU;a^nding of want
seaworthv. which will impact both on insurance and cargo damage issues.
On the other hand, a shipping company being sued will now be subject to a much 
^^ore detailed scrutiny by the court and the plaintiffs lawyer. While this may be a 
useful way of having all facts disclosed, it can certainly also be misused by plaintiffs 
lawyers to embark on a “fishing expedition”
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It is obviously not the aim of the ISM Code to encourage such behaviour, but it is an 
unavoidable side effect. It will be up to the courts and arbitration tribunals to make
f*“***" ... ....... ............ •“■■ “IT ' .........
sure the ISM code is not misused in this way, and to determine the invisible 
borderlines between privileged documents and evidence which may be disclosed.
Although there are certain drawbacks, the spirit behind the ISM Code is clear, 
namely to improve the safe operation of ships and pollution prevention. Much 
depends on the implementation in practice, but the training and awareness of shore- 
based staff and of the seafarers is the best way of reducing maritime accidents.
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